South Asian countries, facing challenges in efficiently meeting growing electricity demand, can benefit from increased cross-border electricity cooperation and trade by harnessing complementarities in electricity demand patterns, diversity in resource endowments for power generation, and gains from larger market access. The region has witnessed slow progress in expanding regional electricity cooperation and trade, and undertaking needed domestic sector reforms. Although bilateral electricity sector cooperation in the region is increasing, broader regional cooperation and trade initiatives have lagged in the face of regional barriers and domestic sector inefficiencies. Deeper electricity market reforms are not a necessity for further development of cross-border electricity trade, but limited progress in overcoming regional and domestic barriers will limit the scope of the regional market and the benefits it can provide.
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Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation in South Asia 1 1. Introduction
Access to reliable, affordable and cleaner energy is a high priority to facilitate further economic development and improved welfare of the population in the South Asia region (SAR). 2 Access to adequate and high-quality energy is part of a larger effort toward reducing adverse impacts of infrastructure scarcity in the region Dappe 2013a, 2013b; Ghosh Banarjee et al, 2015) . In SAR, poor access to electricity combines with unreliable supply due to chronic electricity shortages and unexpected interruptions. 3 Shortages and unpredictable availability of electricity also have led to costly and environmentally harmful investment in small-scale back-up generators (World Bank 2013a, 24) .
Strengthening cross-border electricity cooperation in South Asia can be part of the solution for providing adequate and reliable electricity availability. One reason is that there are complementarities in electricity demand and resource endowments among these countries due to diversity of primary energy resources and differences in seasonal patterns of supply and demand. In addition, increased electricity cooperation and trade among countries can bring economies of scale in investments, strengthen electricity sector financing capability, enhance competition and improve sector efficiency, and enable more cost-effective renewable electricity penetration (Timilsina et al, 2015; Singh et al., 2013; ESMAP, 2010; Srivastava and Mishra, 2007; Thakur, 2004) .For example, Nepal and Bhutan have comparative advantages in hydropower production that can only be realized with cross-border trade. Those countries also experience significant declines in hydroelectric generation during the winter season, and thus would benefit from improved access to thermal-based electricity generation from neighboring countries. Efforts to expand cross-border electricity cooperation and trade in SAR need to be address several barriers. Some of these reflect elements of the regional-level political climate, while others arise due to limited scope and extent of domestic electricity sector policies and renovations. Review of the reform process and identification of barriers to cross-border electricity trade are the main objectives of this paper.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the status of cross-border electricity cooperation in SAR. Section 3 identifies key regional-level barriers to expanding cross-border cooperation and trade in SAR. Section 4 discusses the extent to which current domestic sector policies impede greater cross-border electricity cooperation. Section 5 summarizes the findings of the paper and offers some policy recommendations for moving ahead on increased cross-border trade and cooperation.
Current Status of Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation in South Asia
Increased regional electricity cooperation can be seen as part of a larger interest in expanded trade and cross-border market integration. General interest in regional economic cooperation has existed for some time in SAR; it predates the formation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. The agreement for a South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) signed in 2004 envisioned a transition toward a common market. Tangible expressions of the interest in regional energy cooperation followed soon after the formation of SAFTA. The South Asia Regional Energy Coalition (SAREC) in 2006 was formed to promote advocacy initiatives by leading policy-oriented business associations in South Asia. The SAARC Energy Centre (SEC), established in 2006 as a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) with its base in Islamabad, Pakistan, also has had a focus on regional energy sector cooperation in South Asia.
In late 2014, SAARC member states agreed to a "framework agreement" for regional cooperation in electricity. 4 The agreement contains broad-ranging provisions for the establishment of a regional market for electricity, including nondiscriminatory access to transmission, market-based pricing of electricity exchanged, and establishment of a body for coordinating regional power integration and trade. It remains to be seen how extensively or rapidly these provisions will be put into practice.
At present simple bilateral arrangements for power transmission and trade are predominant. In particular, bilateral generation and transmission arrangements between Nepal-India, India-Bhutan and most recently India-Bangladesh dominate regional electricity cooperation in South Asia Srivastava and Mishra, 2007; Paudyal, 2013) . Table 1 summarizes the current state of cross-border arrangements for electricity sector cooperation in South Asia. These bilateral relationships are mostly based on government-to-government relationships, with a limited to minimal role played by the private sector. 5
Nepal-India Electricity Cooperation
Nepal relies heavily on energy imports from India, which includes importing energy products like electricity, diesel generations and petroleum products and inverters. The history of bilateral electricity cooperation between Nepal and India dates back to as early as 1920s. The Kataiya powerhouse, and Trishuli, Devighat and Phewa hydropower projects were some of the initial government-to government hydroelectric schemes implemented in Nepal with the financial and technical assistance from the Government of India (GoI). Development of the 1 MW hydroelectric project in 1968 at Pokhara with the Indian assistance laid the foundation for how broader electricity sector cooperation between Nepal and India. This was followed up by a 21 MW plant at Trisuli (1969) Nepal and India (Bihar) provide access to electricity to the towns that are accessible easily from across the border through a number of 11 kV and 33 kV crossborder interconnections.
Participants

Cross-border electricity trade
India -Nepal
Nepal imported 793GWh electricity in 2013 from India over multiple interconnections.
India-Bhutan
Electricity import from Bhutan to India was 5556 GWh in -14 (4627 GWh in 2012 from Hydro power stations at Tala, Chukha and Kurichu with a total export led capacity of 1416 MW.
As per an umbrella agreement between the two countries, India assures a minimum of 5000 MWelectricity import by 2020.
Pakistan-Iran
Pakistan imported 419 GWh electricity in 2014 from Iran, up from 375 GWh in the previous year.
Afghanistan-Central Asia
Import of 2,246.2 GWh electricity from Iran, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan in 2011. CASA-1000 expected to enhance this trade.
Pakistan-India
Pakistan has submitted a draft MoU to India on importing electricity using a 1200 MW interconnection. There are also possibilities of CASA to be extended to India.
India-Sri Lanka
Feasibility studies for a 400-kV India-Sri Lanka have been conducted to support import of up to 1000 MW electricity from India.
India-Bangladesh
In 2013, power systems of India and Bangladesh were interconnected through a HVDC line that can support electricity export of up to 500 MW (expandable to 1000 MW in future) from India to Bangladesh based on negotiated price and market based price. Singh et al. (2013) , NTDC (2014) , ERLD (2014) The two countries signed a treaty in 1996 for integrated development of the Mahakali River basin, including Sarada barrage, Tanakpur barrage and Pancheshwar projects.
In July 2001, the GoI nominated the Power Trading Corporation (PTC) as the nodal agency to deal with matters relating to power exchange with Nepal (Mittra, 2012) .
PTC is also the sole agency from the Indian side for finalizing commercial and technical arrangements/systems with the Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) and coordinating with associated Indian agencies. A power trade agreement was signed between Nepal and India in October 2014 to expand the bilateral electricity trade between the two nations. The completion of two double-circuit transmission corridors between Dhalkebar-Muzaffarpur (90 kms) and Hetaua-Duhabi (40 kms) (partly funded by the World Bank), coupled with the operation of a combined 20,000 MW capacity of hydropower projects undergoing feasibility study in Western Nepal is expected to increase the electricity trade between India and Nepal.
Generation capacity addition in Nepal significantly lags behind growing electricity demand, making Nepal a net importer of electricity from India (Figure 1 ). Electricity imports now account for nearly 20% of the total availability. Given the existing demand-supply mismatch in Nepal, it may continue to import electricity from India through the upcoming interconnections in the short-term. However, it can become a net exporter of electricity as the country develops its vast hydroelectric potential. 
Bhutan-India Electricity Cooperation
Bhutan conducts 80% of its total trade with India; electricity trade constitutes 45% of Bhutan's total exports. Electricity is Bhutan's principal export commodity and the largest revenue earner (ADB, 2013) . In 2011-12, earnings from export of electricity to India accounted for 11.4% of the country's GDP . The bilateral arrangements between India and Bhutan started with the Jaldhaka Agreement in 1961. 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 (P) (Singh et al., 2013) . The PTC is the nodal agency responsible for the purchase and sale of power from Bhutan to India.
Apart from gaining significant export income, a minimum 12% royalty from power projects prompted the Royal Government of Bhutan to target 100% electrification in the country by the end of 2013, while ensuring continuity of lifeline electricity consumption to its population. Access to thermal power from India during the dry winter season highlights mutual benefits of interdependency of the two power systems.
India-Bangladesh Electricity Cooperation
In January 2010, Bangladesh and India signed a memorandum of understanding (Brady, 2014) . The Asian Development Bank (ADB) financed the project under an India-Bangladesh power exchange initiative.
Barriers to Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation
The scope and extent of cross-border electricity cooperation varies across regions (Pineau, Hira and Froschauer, 2004; Oseni and Pollitt, 2014) . Regional electricity cooperation for market integration typically evolves in the wake of bilateral crossborder electricity trade arrangements. The more advanced arrangements incorporate shared generation assets and multi-country trading through integrated competitive markets.
Regional agreements for power sector cooperation and trade can take time to achieve.
For example, realization of the Central American Power Market (SIEPAC for its Spanish initials) took 23 years from the time the feasibility study was completed.
Similarly, electricity sector cooperation in the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS) also witnessed a timeline spread over two decades, and still continues to evolve.
Slow progress of cross-border electricity trade can be attributed to technical, operational, political and commercial issues. These vary according to socio-economic and political circumstances in the region. A number of electricity cooperation initiatives around the world have faced some common challenges, even in sophisticated OECD electricity systems (ESMAP, 2010) . For example, transmission and trade cooperation arrangements, such as the Southern Africa Power Pool and the West African Power Pool, have failed to realize their full potential without development and timely implementation of a long-term transmission plan, and differing expectations of electricity prices by buyers and sellers .
Arguably, the current state and magnitude of electricity cooperation and trade in SAR is far less than the potential considering the regional diversity of energy resource endowments and differences in demand patterns across countries in the region (Wijayatunga and Fernando, 2013; Singh et al., 2013 ,Timilsina et al, 2015 . We focus in this section on three regional-level barriers. In the next section we consider how weaknesses in domestic sector policies also impede cross-border cooperation and trade.
Dynamic and Uncertain Regional Political Climate
Historical animosity or lack of trust has often frustrated the process of regional cooperation in South Asia, including regional power sector cooperation. While there are encouraging signs, political rhetoric for electricity cooperation has not consistently translated into the political will and action for cooperation in South Asia (Paudyal, 2013) . Internal political conflicts also have slowed down the process of regional electricity sector cooperation. In addition, the government-to-government model for cross-border trade typically involves lengthy political as well as technical negotiations, diminishing economic gains.
Regional cooperation is perceived by some as a threat to national safety and energy security, as reflected in debates over power trade between India and Pakistan (Mukherji and Chaturvedi, 2013) . In another case, inability of the Bangladeshi government to provide a guaranteed supply of natural gas for a proposed USD 3 billion power project investment in Bangladesh by an Indian company resulted in the latter abandoning the business venture altogether (Rahman et al., , 2012) . On the other hand, entry of Chinese investment has prompted India to explore electricity cooperation with Sri Lanka and Nepal (Chaturvedi, 2013; Mittra, 2012) .
The ability of the cross-border trade of electricity to address public interest, social and environmental concerns has been questioned (Williams and Ghanadan, 2006) . For example, large-scale development of water resources in Nepal and Bhutan will generate significant economic rents. Debates over the distribution of such rents can generate conflicts and opposition to large-scale resource development initiatives.
Absence of a Platform for Cross-Border Regulatory Coordination
Increased electricity cooperation and trade in the region requires national regulators to pay more attention to harmonization and coordination of their regulatory practices.
Technical aspects such as rules and procedures concerning transmission access and its pricing, congestion management, operational codes and protocols for system operation, energy accounting and payment thereof, and data transfer protocols need to be gradually harmonized for seamless and stable operation of the transmission systems. 6
Tariff and Non-Tariff Market Barriers
Like other commodities and services, trade in electricity is hindered by export tax, import duty and transit tax. The South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA), when signed, did not give special treatment to energy, particularly electricity trade.
Although signing in 2014 of the SAARC Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation (Electricity) during 18th SAARC Summit in Kathmandu has given impetus to expanded regional power trade, more needs to be done for implementation of a regional agreement for free trade of electricity. For example, electricity import licensing restrictions in India that limit participation to specifically identified (socalled nodal) agencies also limit entry in cross-border trade and hinder the development of power exchange .
Power sector trade-related reforms also are inter-dependent with wider reforms, and failure to harmonize inter-sector reforms can lead to power sector reform measures being ineffective (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012b) . For example, India and Sri Lanka are yet to sign a free trade agreement, while India also has been reluctant to waive imports duty for imported construction equipment and materials to Nepal from a third country. Similarly, Pakistan is yet to grant Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to enhance trade with India.
Impact of National Electricity Sector Policies on Cross-Border Cooperation and Trade in South Asia
In addition to regional-level barriers to increased cross-border electricity cooperation and trade in SAR, weaknesses in domestic sector policies also create impediments.
To build the case for this assertion, in this section we review the status of sector policies and performance in SAR.
Overview of Power Sector Reforms in South Asia
Countries in the South Asia region initiated national electricity sector reforms following somewhat different timelines, as shown in Table 2 below. 7 The process of reform in the power sector was undertaken to address several ongoing problems: the fiscal burden of price subsidies and low revenue collection rates, and the economic burden of low service quality, and high network losses experienced under largely state-owned and controlled systems (Newbery, 2002 , Singh, 2006 . One of the objectives of sector reform in SAR (as elsewhere) is to attract more domestic and foreign private sector investments (Singh, 2007) . Other objectives include reducing dependence on state support and ensuring affordable and reliable service quality (Lama et al., 2002) .To accomplish these aims, it is ultimately necessary to manage sector activities in a more economically efficient and competitive manner. 8
As indicated in Table 2 , the single buyer model (SBM) (one buyer and many sellers)
dominates the wholesale generation market arrangements across the region. Only
India has introduced a degree of competition in wholesale markets for electricity, and a day-ahead market (Singh 2010; Thakur et al., 2005) . Vertically integrated incumbent electric utilities in Pakistan and India have undertaken functional unbundling . Partial unbundling has been undertaken in Bhutan, as well as Sri Lanka. By law, Bhutan has designated a government entity to be the single buyer of electricity for all power projects, including the private ones. The electricity sector in Bangladesh is 7 The appendix contains more details on national sector policy changes in individual SAR countries. 8 Market reform approaches have been influenced to a greater or lesser extent by the "standard sector reform" model, which gained prominence in policy and analytical circles in the early 1990s. The standard model for electricity reform involves the following reform sequence and steps (Victor, 2005; Jamasb, 2006) : i) establishment of an independent sector regulator; ii) corporatization of state-owned enterprises; iii) establishment of laws for electricity sector liberalization; iv) unbundling (or vertical separation) of the main industry segments (generation, transmission, distribution); v) implementation of more incentive-based regulation of electricity networks, to induce improved performance; vi) establishment of a wholesale electricity market; vii) privatization; and viii) introduction of independent power producers (IPPs).
horizontally unbundled with separate entities, catering to the requirements of the rural and urban areas. A legislative initiative has been advanced to unbundle the Nepal Electricity Authority. However, the fate of this remains unclear due to the persistent political uncertainty in the country. Independent regulatory commissions have been introduced in the majority of SAR countries. The process is still pending in Nepal (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a) , and remains partially implemented in Bhutan. More generally, the reform process has been slow in most of the SAR countries. In Sri Lanka, for example, a new Electricity
Act was enacted only in 2009. Even in India, where the reform process has operated for almost two decades, politics and reform remain intertwined (Dubash and Rao, 2008; Tongia, 2007) .
In India, market-oriented reform has had to face a number of challenges, although market-oriented activity including short-term competitive power markets is increasing (Littlechild, 2013) . There is evidence that reform in India since the early 1990s has improved operational efficiencies (Cropper et al 2011) , though effects are not necessarily realized immediately (Sen and Jamasb, 2012) . While the country has embraced deeper market reforms that improved competition in the generation sector, the distribution sector continues to exhibit serious operational inefficiency as well as financial losses (Pargal and Ghosh Banarjee, 2014) . 11 Losses also are serious in Bangladesh and Pakistan, where prices remain below cost-recovery levels and, in Pakistan, rate increases approved by the regulator are overridden by the legislature.
Performance of National Electricity Policy Reforms
The reforms in the electricity sector in most of the SAR countries have been aimed mainly at enhancing operational performance, with relatively less emphasis on being "market-oriented". India remains an exception by opening up the sector to competition and adopting market-oriented policies. To accomplish the objective of 10 All four electricity distribution companies in Orissa were privatized (three distribution companies to BSES Ltd, now Reliance Energy Ltd., and one to AES of USA). Due to regulatory and legal issues, however, AES exited the business and the control of that company fell back to the state government. 11 Wolak (2008) argues that India's institutions for electricity regulation themselves need significant restructuring to support restructuring of the country's power sector.
improving operational and financial performance of the sector, it is important that reforms include cost-reflective electricity pricing and effective targeting of electricity subsidies to improve the financial viability of the sector, as well as gradually opening up the sector to increased competition.
The lack of cost reflective pricing in SAR has been a major contributor to financial problems of national power sectors. The inability of the sectors to generate sufficient surplus has affected the ability of the electric utilities to invest in capacity additions for electricity generation, transmission, and distribution. It also has stunted incentives for private sector entry in generation, even if the entry barriers for the same have been lowered or removed. Poor financial and operational performance in the electricity sectors of SAR countries reflects weaknesses in the structure and governance of the sector (Bhattacharya, 2007) .
Many of the anticipated benefits of reforms have been realized only to a limited extent, if at all. The performance indicators summarized in Table 3 provide evidence supporting these assertions. 12 The specific problems include the following:
(i) Insufficient investment in generation capacity.
The pace of growth in investments in power generation across the SAR remains slow;
it does not match the growth in electricity demand of existing consumers, or to the new consumers gaining electricity access. The result is a large number of rolling power outages (Nayar et al, 2012) . For example, some rural areas in Pakistan experienced load shedding and blackouts up to 20 hours a day in 2012, while Nepal also experienced up to 14-hour daily power outages in 2013 (Sovacool et al., 2013) .
Against a peak demand of 6500 MW, Bangladesh experienced load shedding of 1000-1200 MW in (GoB, 2014a There are estimates indicating that inadequate power supply imposes significant costs on South Asian economies. For example, the cost of load shedding to the Pakistani economy was estimated to be PKR 1,272 billion (Pakistani Rupees) in 2011-12, equivalent to 6% of the economy (Saeed, 2013) . Table 4 , based on data from World Bank enterprise surveys, provides an assessment of the direct loss of economic output by electricity users due to electricity outages in South Asian countries, along with additional statistics indicating the degree of service unreliability in the region.
(ii) Low operational efficiency and service quality.
Technical losses (both transmission and distribution) are estimated to average 14-25% of electricity generation in the region (Smith, 2004 (Singh, 2006) . The non-technical electricity losses due to power theft can involve fraud (meter tampering), stealing (illegal connections), billing irregularities such as non-payment, and corruption (Smith, 2004) . In April 2014, power was cut off in 18 government buildings in Pakistan including the Presidential residence because of nonpayment of electricity bills. In Bangladesh, electricity theft was estimated to be at 14%. In India, a third of electricity is lost through non-technical losses each year (Min and Golden, 2014 (GoI, 2011 . In some states the arrearages were the equivalent of well over a
year of unpaid power consumption. 15
In Pakistan, the sector is suffering from a growing "circular debt" problem. The circular debt arises when an operating entity facing problems with outstanding receivables holds back payments to its suppliers and creditors (Kessides, 2013) . The lack of payments affects various government departments, generation and distribution companies under the control of KESC and PEPCO, domestic and international fuel suppliers, and refineries in the Pakistani power sector. They affect the fiscal position of the government as a whole.
The circular debt in the power sector had reached PKR 537.5million in 2011, with the potential to lead to shutdown of generation plants and further worsening of demandsupply imbalances in the power sector (Javaid, 2012) . The new government at the time settled the existing circular debt through a one-time government subvention of PKR 480 billion in July 2013. However, the issue re-emerged soon afterwards, highlighting the fact that the underlying causal factors had not been effectively addressed. A report commissioned by the Planning Commission of Pakistan identifies the main source to be a difference between the "tariff differential subsidy" (TDS) the government claims to pay to distribution companies versus the amount actually 13 One US Dollar= NRS. 97 and PKRS. 98 (as of May,2014) and one INR. = 160 NPR. 14 See also Dossani (2004) for discussion of the reorganization of the Indian distribution sector. 15 Additional details are in Pargal and Ghosh Banarjee (2014) . disbursed. A second cause is the T&D losses that distribution companies are allowed by NEPRA for tariff determination are lower than the actual levels (GoP, 2013) . State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs) grapple with a similar situation in India (Singh, 2006) .
(iv) Limited involvement of the private sector. Attracting foreign and domestic capital through private sector participation in the power sector was one of the major objectives of reforms in SAR (Victor and Heller, 2007) . Hence, IPPs were allowed to sell electricity to the grid under state supported long-term contracts in the SAR.
Reforms in the region thus have had some success in attracting private sector participation in power generation. For example, in both Nepal and Sri Lanka, IPPs'
share of installed generation capacity increased from 21% in 2004 16 to around 33% in 2012 (see Table 3 above). In India, the share of the private sector in the electricity generation capacity has grown to more than 34% by the year (CEA, 2014 . In Pakistan, the share of the private sector increased from 30% in 2004-05 to 49.34% by June 2013 (GoP, 2013 . In Bangladesh, the share of private sector in total generation capacity was 40% in July 2014. 17 Nonetheless, many IPP projects built rapidly to address electricity shortages are small in scale and not cost-effective. Nonetheless, there is little happening at present in moving toward broader privatization in the distribution segment.
Implications of Limited National Sector Reforms on Development of Cross-Border Electricity Cooperation and Trade
Domestic power sector reforms have an important bearing on the prospects for success in cooperation, cross-border and ultimately regionally (Belyaev, 2011) . In particular incomplete domestic power sector reforms can create barriers for facilitating wider electricity cooperation. Some of these barriers are easy to infer from the discussion in the previous subsections. Domestic policy distortions, including investment recovery rules and subsidies in pricing, reduce incentives for expanding generation investment for increased cross-border trade and limit the reward for expanding transmission capacity. Underpriced electricity does not provide effective signals to attract private domestic and foreign investment, as the scope for earning a reasonable rate of return on the capital employed is low. Moreover, investment risks will be higher when erstwhile partners in cross-border investment and trade are in a weak financial condition and may not be able to deliver on promised levels and quality of service.
Weak laws and policies may provide electric utilities with substantial potential to exercise domestic market power. This, in turn, can create barriers to entry for new players in a regional market, even to the point of making competition unsustainable (Green, 2003) . Market power issues remain important, as reforms have on many occasions failed to adequately address them (Newbery, 2002) . The strong opposition to opening of domestic markets to foreign imports and the resulting interest in anticompetitive policies and practices should not be underestimated (ESMAP, 2010) .
Weak markets due to regulatory distortions can also complicate long-term contracting for power and make financing cross-border electricity trade more challenging, in particular by creating regulatory risks and limiting options for trading partners.
As previously noted, effective cross-border trade requires institutional capacities for tracking electricity flows, maintaining grid integrity, collecting and transferring revenues, and resolving disputes, among other functions. Inefficient and inertia-bound domestic electricity sector policies and regulatory institutions impede establishment of the desired quality of cross-border coordination.
Conclusions and Implications
Expanded electricity cooperation in SAR can play an important role in long-term economic development of the region. This paper has analyzed the existing state of electricity cooperation in SAR, and considered barriers to increased cross-border cooperation and trade. Some policy, institutional, and political barriers operate at the regional level: lack of confidence and trust, trade-restrictive policies, and challenges in creating effective regional bodies for cross-border coordination.
In addition, political instability and uncertainty and political economy related issues that have limited reforms in regulation of the sector at the national level and led to disappointing sectoral performance also adversely affect opportunities for crossborder electricity cooperation and trade in the region. Sector performance in South Asia continues to be characterized by chronic revenue inadequacy, deteriorating fixed assets and equipment, poor service quality, and severe problems of theft and unpaid bills. Slow progress in addressing these problems also has slowed progress toward achieving greater electricity cooperation and trade in SAR.
Initiatives to engage in cross-border trade of electricity predate the onset of modern domestic power sector reforms. Domestic market reforms are not a precondition for developing cross-border electricity trade, as demonstrated by existing electricity trading arrangements in South Asia. However, power sector reforms in participating countries provide a significant boost to the development of a well-functioning regional electricity market with substantial shared gains for the countries of the region.
Conversely, stronger regional cooperation and trade in electricity can help strengthen Participation in cross-border electricity trade need not expand all-at-once and at all levels, but can develop in a somewhat piecemeal fashion, with greater opportunities for expanding trade in nations that have adopted widespread electricity market reforms. Policies toward regional electricity integration in SAR can follow a threetrack approach based on the existing status of the power sector reforms. In the short term, increased bilateral arrangements between countries based on increased interconnections and cross-border trade can be achieved. This will require agreements based on relatively simple rules for operating the bilateral interconnections between countries.
In the medium term, increased sub-regional integration also involving third parties (such as trade between Nepal and Bangladesh with India as a transit country) can grow. This level of electricity cooperation will require harmonizing access rules, grid codes and protocols and electricity transmission charges. Participating countries also can access short-term power markets in India (and elsewhere as they develop) to meet domestic requirements, as Nepal and Bangladesh already are doing to their advantage.
Intensifying bilateral electricity cooperation in the short and medium term can catalyze and harmonize electricity reforms in the region in the long term. However, example of a fuller integration of multiple national electricity systems into a regional market (Glachant and Levque, 2009). deeper cooperation arrangements are best pursued in the presence of a regional market for power; an organization or forum for cross-country coordination that can help sustain agreements on market access, among other elements; and an institutional mechanism for coordinating and maintaining transmission in an effective and nondiscriminatory manner. Deeper levels of electricity cooperation in turn will depend on a greater degree of harmonization of reforms in national electricity markets, a gradual process. The different stages of regional cooperation can co-exist and gradually converge as sector reforms in the region progress. It must be emphasized, however, that gains from regional cooperation will be limited without development of market institutions and coordination institutions/forum, in addition to the desired domestic policy reforms.
Strong political will and policy continuity remain crucial for achieving higher levels of electricity cooperation considering the lengthiness of the cooperation process.
Dismantling political barriers in South Asia to regional electricity cooperation and installing greater economic rationalization in the domestic electricity sectors is indeed challenging but certainly possible.
APPENDIX Electricity Sector Reforms In SAR Countries
Here we take a closer look at key individual country experiences and issues. 19
A.1. India
Power sector reforms in India started in 1991 with the introduction of IPPs as the country faced a severe balance of payment crisis while the performance of the stateowned utilities prior reforms was poor. As such, it is "difficult to imagine more adverse initial conditions" for any electricity restructuring than were present in India at the time of reforms (Wolak, 2008) . The first step towards reform included unbundling of the erstwhile state electricity boards (SEBs) and setting up independent State Electricity Regulatory Commissions (SERCs). Beginning with Orissa in 1995, the process was imitated in nine other states. All these states unbundled the state electricity board by creating several distribution companies, one transmission and bulk supply company 20 and several distribution companies (Bhattacharya, 2007 , Singh, 2006 . (Singh, 2010) . It is considered as the most comprehensive policy in the region by far (Dossani, 2004; Sinha, 2005; Ryan, 2013) .
This ushered in an era of 'competition in the market' by introducing licensed traders and by enabling setting up of the power exchanges to encourage wholesale electricity 19 Information on electricity policies in SAR countries also can be found in ADB (2013) . 20 This bulk supply company acted as a single buyer to purchase electricity from all sources and then sell it onward to the distribution companies. This is known as the single buyer model (SBM). 21 49% holding of Orissa Power Generation Company, the generation company of Orissa was sold to a private investor.
trade as a separate activity from the network segments. An Amendment to the Electricity Act 2003 was introduced in 2007 permitting captive power generators to supply power directly to consumers. The country currently has two power exchanges selling dispatchable electricity products, which are primarily dominated by the Day Ahead Market (DAM). In 2012-13, the short-term electricity market, comprised of the trades brokered through the licensed traders and those through the power exchanges, accounted for about 11% of the total electricity generated in the country . Table A -1 below provides a timeline of the power sector developments in India.
A.2. Bangladesh
In Bangladesh, the electricity sector experienced changes as early as in 1977 with the creation of the Rural Electrification Board and establishment of 70 large distribution cooperatives within it (Rahman, 2008) . Supply Company Limited (DESCO) were formed in 1996 (see Table A -2) . Foreign investment in the sector was also allowed in the same year. PGCB is a legally unbundled system operator for the electricity transmission network in the country.
PGCB was to take over the transmission assets from the Bangladesh Power Development Board (BPDB), which was established in 1972. However, it took seven years for the transfer to be completed (GoB, 2004) . Table A -2 below provides a timeline of the power sector developments in Bangladesh. System Master Plan was prepared. It has forecasted peak electricity demand to grow from 6454 MW in 2010 to 33,708 MW in 2030. To meet this demand, the country would need to develop significant additional electricity generation capacity domestically, and explore importing electricity from neighboring countries in the region. Bangladesh also aims to achieve 100% household electrification by 2021, a challenging task given that the country was able to achieve 49% electrification by (GoB, 2011 . In 2010, the government put in place a Power and Energy Fast Supply Enhancement (Special Provision) Act, empowering it to bypass the tendering process for setting up new generation plant and transmission facilities for a period of two years. This led to signing of contracts with 25 firms to setup about 3000 MW of generation capacity (Ebinger, 2010) . These high price contracts necessitated considerable subsidies by the government to hold down retail electricity prices to individual consumers (GoB, 2014a).
A.3. Pakistan
Growing electricity shortages in Pakistan during the 1970s and the first half of 1980s prompted the government to take initiatives to encourage private sector participation in generation of electricity (see Table A distribution, supply and use of electricity (PUSCL, 2014a). Initially, PUSCL was not empowered to determine tariffs but after the 2009 Act, the commission achieved real powers to regulate tariffs (Amarawickrama and Hunt, 2004) . The Sri Lankan Parliament passed the Sri Lanka Electricity Act No. 20 of 2009 to replace the Electricity Reform Act 2002 with the major aim of empowering the PUSCL to effectively regulate the power sector (PUSCL, 2014b). However the Act did not become fully effective because of factors such as changing governments and public opposition, limiting the PUSCL to its advisory roles only while the Act in itself had too little to empower the commission. Source: Compiled from GoP (1997, 2013) ; NEPRA (2014) The Sri Lankan attempt over 25 years to privatize the CEB has faced mass opposition from trade unions fearing job losses. The government is keen to privatize the power sector as a means to raise money and relieve the financial burden of the heavily indebted CEB. An attempt to sell the CEB failed in 2002 due to protests by the workers while the passing of the power reform bill in 2009 also faced opposition from some trade unions.
The transmission, bulk purchase of power as well as distribution within its own areas remained a monopoly of the CEB. Competition was brought about by tendering requirement for procurement of power by the CEB. This was also modified later, see Table A-4 hydropower development while allowing for private sector participation. The NEA Act was amended to provide 'autonomy' to the NEA and it became a licensee to buy electricity generated by private IPPs's). The Electricity Tariff Fixation Rules 2050 (1994) issued under Section 40 of Electricity Act, 2049 (1992) led to the establishment of the Electricity and Tariff Fixation Commission (ETFC) in 1994 to regulate electricity prices.
The Hydropower Policy 2058 (2001) was issued with an intention to attract more foreign and domestic private sector investments, with ETFC to be developed as a regulatory body (Nepal and Jamasb, 2012a) . The 2001 policy also recognized the need to develop hydropower as an 'exportable commodity' (GoN, 2001) . ETFC 
